What Is Illiberal Democracy—and How Does It Work?
Illiberal democracy describes a system where free elections coexist with eroded civil liberties, weakened courts, and controlled media. Here is how it works, where it has taken root, and why scholars warn it is spreading.
Elections Without Freedom
The phrase sounds like a contradiction: a democracy that is not free. Yet political scientists have spent nearly three decades studying governments that hold regular elections while systematically dismantling the protections most people associate with democratic rule—independent courts, a free press, minority rights, and limits on executive power.
The term illiberal democracy was popularized by journalist and scholar Fareed Zakaria in a landmark 1997 essay in Foreign Affairs. Zakaria observed that around the world, democratically elected leaders were "routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and depriving citizens of basic rights and freedoms." He argued that democracy (free elections) and constitutional liberalism (rule of law, separation of powers, individual rights) had historically traveled together in the West—but were increasingly coming apart elsewhere.
How Illiberal Democracy Works
An illiberal democracy does not seize power through a coup. Instead, it erodes democratic norms gradually from within, using the very institutions it undermines. Scholars identify several recurring mechanisms:
- Constitutional manipulation: Ruling parties use parliamentary supermajorities to rewrite constitutions, stack courts with loyalists, and eliminate term limits.
- Media capture: Independent outlets are pressured through regulatory action, ownership changes, or frivolous lawsuits until they self-censor or close. State-aligned media fill the vacuum.
- Civil society squeeze: Non-governmental organizations face burdensome registration requirements, foreign-funding bans, or outright prohibition.
- Electoral tilting: Elections still occur, but gerrymandering, control of state media, and selective enforcement of campaign laws give incumbents an overwhelming structural advantage.
The result is what scholars call competitive authoritarianism—a system where opposition can technically compete but almost never win.
Where It Has Taken Root
Hungary is widely considered the textbook case. In 2014, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán openly declared that Hungary would pursue an "illiberal state," citing Singapore, China, and Russia as models. Since returning to power in 2010, his Fidesz party has won successive supermajorities, rewritten the constitution, brought most media under allied ownership, and constrained judicial independence. Freedom House reclassified Hungary from a liberal democracy to a "partly free" country—the first European Union member to earn that designation.
Hungary is not alone. Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has followed a similar trajectory, concentrating power in the presidency while jailing journalists and opposition politicians. In El Salvador, President Nayib Bukele has governed under a prolonged state of emergency and pushed through a constitutional amendment eliminating presidential term limits. Venezuela's co-opted judiciary and electoral council have stripped elections of meaningful competition.
Why It Spreads
Illiberal democracy often gains traction during periods of economic anxiety, migration pressure, or public disillusionment with established political elites. Leaders promise decisive action on problems that liberal institutions seem slow to address. By framing checks and balances as obstacles to the "will of the people," they build popular support for concentrating power.
According to Freedom House's 2026 report, global freedom has declined for 20 consecutive years, with 54 countries experiencing deterioration in political rights and civil liberties in the most recent year alone, compared to just 35 that improved.
Why It Matters
The distinction between liberal and illiberal democracy is not academic. In a liberal democracy, elections are one component of a broader system that protects minorities, ensures judicial independence, and guarantees freedoms of speech and assembly. Strip those away, and elections become little more than a legitimizing ritual for entrenched power.
As Zakaria warned in 1997, "Democracy without constitutional liberalism is not simply inadequate, but dangerous." Nearly three decades later, that warning resonates more widely than ever.
